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MATTHIAS J. BORGERS*
REGULATING AND COMBATING UNDERGROUND
BANKING
ABSTRACT. In combating and regulating underground banking, a choice can be
made of roughly two models, the risk model and the assimilation model. The risk
model comes down to a complete prohibition of underground banking combined
with an active investigation and prosecution policy. In the assimilation model,
underground banking is recognised as a form of financial services but at the same
time, all rules that generally apply to financial services are declared applicable to
underground bankers. An effort is made simultaneously to lower the threshold of the
formal banking system. The international recommendations and legislation—in
particular of the Financial Action Task Force and the European Union—take the
assimilation model as their starting point, albeit that no or hardly any attention is
paid to the role of the formal banking system. With that, relatively little account is
taken as yet in the international community of the historic and socio-economic
backgrounds of informal banking systems, their embedment in different cultures and
the advantages of the services offered.
I INTRODUCTION
Attention for underground banking has increased sharply since
the attacks of 11 September 2001. Since then, not only national
legislators, but also international institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Financial Action
Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), and researchers have
thought about the most appropriate way to regulate and/or com-
bat underground banking. Several initiatives have in the meanwhile
been developed on that level and the necessary rules and regula-
tions have been enacted. This paper is devoted to such regulation
and combating of underground banking and centres on two
questions. Which points for attention should be taken into account
* Professor of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, VU University Amsterdam,
Faculty of Law, Department of Criminal Law and Criminology.
Criminal Law Forum (2009) 20:97–111  Springer 2009
DOI 10.1007/s10609-008-9089-2
in the regulation and combating of underground banking in gen-
eral? Which enforcement and combating policy will be chosen in
the international recommendations and legislation on that level?
These questions are discussed consecutively in sections 2 and 3 and
answered as far as possible. The findings are summarised in Sect. 4
and provided with some brief concluding observations.
Several comments need to be made in advance on the terminology
used. In this paper, underground banking refers to so-called infor-
mal value transfer systems. According to the broad definition given to
this by Passas, the core of such systems relates to the transfer of sums
of money or other objects of a certain value from one place to an-
other by a person or organisation not considered as a bank or
financial institution.1 It therefore concerns the conduct of financial
transactions—in particular exchanging money and having it paid to
another person—outside the formal financial system defined and
regulated by the government. I will henceforth refer to these trans-
actions as informal money transactions or money transfers. Char-
acteristic of underground banking is that it evades government
supervision.2 The question can be raised whether the term under-
ground banking is the most appropriate. An objection to this could
be that this manner of conducting financial transactions is not always
underground, in the sense of taking place in secret.3 The extent to
which persons who provide informal financial transactions provide
their services in public mainly depends on the geographic location as
well as the prevailing enforcement and combating policy. Something
similar holds for the connotation of underground with the criminal
environment. Even though informal financial transfer systems are
vulnerable to use or abuse by criminals and terrorists, the emergence
of such systems is not based on an effort to facilitate criminal
1 Nikos Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations; a
study into so-called underground banking networks 10 (WODC 1999); Nikos Passas,
Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Activities 3–4 (WODC 2005).
2 Marieke de Goede, Hawala discourses and the war on terrorist finance, 21 Envi-
ronment and PlanningD: Society and Space 513, 514 (2003); Divya Sharma,Historical
Traces of Hundi, Sociocultural Understanding, and Criminal Abuses of Hawala, 16
International Criminal Justice Review 99, 108 (2006); Henk van de Bunt, The Role of
Hawala Bankers in the Transfer of Proceeds from Organised Crime, in Organized
Crime. Culture, Markets and Policies 113 (Dina Siegel & Hans Nelen eds., 2008).
3 De Goede (2003), supra note 2, 513–514.
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activities.4 That the term underground banking is used nevertheless
in this paper is connected with the fact that the term is established
and is also used in official documents.
II DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO REGULATING AND
COMBATING UNDERGROUND BANKING
2.1 Two Models
It is an established fact that underground banking is the subject of
regulation and combating in very many countries. The reasons for
this are actually expressed in the comments made in the introduction
in relation to the terminology used. Underground banking is char-
acterised by its evasion of government supervision, which is a primary
reason for the government to take action against underground
bankers. Furthermore, underground banking may be related in some
way to the commission of criminal acts and terrorist activities. That is
also a reason to take measures against underground bankers.
This observation does not say much about the way in which
underground banking is regulated or combated. A choice can roughly
be made from two models. First of all, there is the option of com-
pletely prohibiting underground banking in combination with an
active investigation and prosecution policy. The choice of this model
is logical mainly when the elimination of all possible risks involved in
underground banking, such as the facilitation of crime and terrorism,
is placed first and foremost. In addition, an approach can be chosen
in which underground banking is allowed, provided that certain
requirements are met. In that model, underground banking is
recognised as a type of financial services, but at the same time all rules
and regulations that generally apply to financial services are declared
applicable to underground bankers. In this model as well, therefore,
the pure form of underground banking, whereby the rules and
regulations generally applicable to financial services are not observed,
is prohibited. But unlike in the first model, the total exclusion of
4 Passas (1999), supra note 1, 37–45; Nikos Passas, Hawala and Other Informal
Value Transfer Systems: How to Regulate Them?, 5 Risk Management 49, 50 (2003);
Rachana Pathak, The obstacles to regulating the Hawala: A cultural norm or a
terrorist hotbed?, 27 Fordham International Law Journal 2007, 2009–2010, 2028
(2003); Maryam Razavy, Hawala: An underground haven for terrorists or social
phenomenon?, 44 Crime, Law and Social Change 277, 288 (2005); Abdullahi Y.
Shehu, The Asian Alternative Remittance Systems and Money Laundering, 7 Journal
of Money Laundering Control 175, 183 (2003); Sharma, supra note 2, 107, 109.
REGULATING AND COMBATING UNDERGROUND BANKING 99
underground banking is not first and foremost. This mainly concerns
bringing about a process of inclusion or assimilation. I will refer to
the first model henceforth as the risk model and the second as the
assimilation model.
In order to make a choice of one of these models—and also in
giving further shape to the chosen approach—numerous points of
view are relevant. This does not only concern the arguments in favour
of curbing underground banking, but precisely the problems and
dilemmas that governments can face in regulating and combating it
are relevant. In the following, I intend to give an overview, albeit a
rough one, of the range of points of view.
2.2 A Closer Look at the Risk Model
In the risk model, as stated, the central issue is to prevent the risks
involved in underground banking as far as possible. The model is in
keeping with the risk-based approach to money laundering and the
financing of terrorism described by De Goede, which has been
fashionable since the attacks of 11 September 2001. In this approach,
attention is paid not only to transactions which are themselves illegal
in nature, but also to transactions which are not illegal in themselves
but whereby the amount transferred could be used for illegal pur-
poses some time in the future.5 In specific terms: even though nothing
is necessarily wrong with funds transferred by way of underground
banking, if there is a chance that such funds—or at any rate part of
them—will end up in the hands of criminals or terrorists, that is
sufficient reason to combat underground banking in its entirety.
An illustration in this context is the offensive launched in theUnited
States of America against underground banking since the attacks of 11
September 2001. The main reason for this was the suspicion that the
funds used to prepare those attacks were obtained with the aid of
underground banking. At the time, not only did the American gov-
ernment enact the legislation necessary to combat underground
banking—within the framework of the controversial Patriot Act—but
large-scale actions were also launched against underground bankers,
including the Somali conglomerate Al-Barakaat.6 Afterwards, how-
ever, it could not be established that underground banking had played
5 Marieke de Goede, Financial Regulation and the War on Terror, in Global Fi-
nance in the New Century. Beyond Regulation 193, 196 (Libby Assassi et al. eds.,
2007).
6 Pathak, supra note 4, 2041–2050.
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a significant part in preparing these attacks, whereas it did emerge that
the formal banking system had been used.7
It should therefore be realised that underground banking has been
surrounded by a lot of myth formation in the media, in which
underground banking is portrayed as a more harmful phenomenon
than can be justified on the basis of the facts.8 This, of course, does
not mean that the fact that underground banking evades government
supervision does not attract criminals and terrorists to some extent.
But those groups of persons also use the formal banking system.9 The
sustainability of the above-mentioned rationale of the risk model can
therefore be called into question.
It is important as well that combating underground banking in its
entirety can have undesired social side effects. Closing down informal
money transfer systems results, for example in cutting off the flows of
money from migrants staying in the West to family in the country of
origin. Those flows of money cannot always be rerouted to the formal
banking system, particularly not if the country of destination does
not have a properly operating banking system.10 The American ac-
tion against Al Barakaat has shown that taking action against
underground banking can have very far-reaching consequences for
residents of poor countries who rely for their subsistence on funds
transferred by family members staying in the West.11
Finally, the feasibility and effectiveness of the use of the risk model
can be questioned. Underground banking almost always relates to
cross-border transactions. This international dimension means that it
is difficult to combat underground banking successfully if other
countries do not take similar measures.12 It is also quite possible that
a rigorous approach to underground banking would drive under-
ground bankers (even) further underground, in the sense that
7 Passas (2003), supra note 4, 50; Pathak, supra note 4, 2028; Passas (2005), supra
note 1, 36; Razavy, supra note 4, 290; Sharma, supra note 2, 101–102; Van de Bunt,
supra note 2, 114.
8 De Goede (2003), supra note 2, 518; Razavy, supra note 4, 278, 286; Sharma,
supra note 2, 109.
9 De Goede (2003), supra note 2, 517.
10 Pathak, supra note 4, 2022.
11 De Goede (2003), supra note 2, 520; Pathak, supra note 4, 2007, 2051–2052;
Razavy, supra note 4, 277–278.
12 Pathak, supra note 4, 2054–2056; Razavy, supra note 4, 289.
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underground bankers and their customers would make (even) more
of an effort to keep their operations out of sight of the government.13
Moreover, as stated in the literature, the underground banking sys-
tem is extremely resilient. The system proves able to recover time and
time again after government actions to combat it.14 This shows that
the policy for combating underground banking is not very effective.
Governments could also burn their fingers with a stringent approach
to underground banking. If a suspicion exists that transactions which
have been or will be conducted by underground bankers are relevant
to a criminal investigation, it would be more difficult to perform the
necessary investigative actions if those transactions were to take place
(even) more in secret. Regulating and combating can therefore have
repercussions on the possibilities for investigation.15
2.3 A Closer Look at the Assimilation Model
In the assimilation model, underground banking is not totally pro-
hibited, but possibilities are sought to allow underground banking to
continue to exist subject to certain preconditions. The first order of
importance in this model is to bring about government regulation
and supervision of underground banking. This model is based on the
idea that regulation of underground banking can be effective only if
account is taken of the historic and cultural backgrounds of informal
banking systems and also of the advantages such systems still have
nowadays for its customers. It is therefore meaningful to deal further,
although briefly, with several characteristics of underground banking.
First of all, trust plays a very important role. Underground
banking takes place on the basis of customers trust that the under-
ground banker, together with those with whom he works, will settle
their transactions properly. Such trust is embedded in the cultures of
ethnic groups within which underground banking has already been
an acceptable and common type of financial services for a long time.
The social ties between bankers amongst themselves as well as in their
relationship to the customers are an important safeguard against
13 Razavy, supra note 4, 291.
14 Matthias Schramm & Markus Taube, Evolution and institutional foundation of
the hawala financial system, 12 International Review of Financial Analysis 405, 418
(2003); Walter Perkel, Money Laundering and Terrorism: Informal Value Transfer
Systems, 41 American Criminal Law Review 203–204 (2004); Nikos Passas, Dirty
money? Tracing the misuse of hawala networks, Janes Intelligence Review 42 (March
2008).
15 Perkel, supra note 14, 198; Passas (2008), supra note 14, 45.
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dysfunctioning of those services.16 Trust is also vital to the formal
banking system,17 but this is a different type of trust. In the Western
world, government supervision as well as the collective facilities
provided with a view the possible dysfunctioning of financial insti-
tutions (for example through the insolvency of a bank), are a major
component of the publics trust in financial institutions.
Furthermore, it is important that the services underground
bankers provide—currency exchange and money transfers—are also
carried out by the institutionalised financial institutions. A series of
reasons can be given why certain groups prefer the services of
underground bankers. Passas summarised the advantages of under-
ground banking in the catchwords: fast, cheap, reliable, easy, discrete
and accessible.18 I will not discuss these advantages further here; they
have already been described many times in the literature.19 What is
concerned here is that any strategy for regulating and combating
underground banking will have to compete against its advantages. In
this regard, it should be borne in mind that the formal banking
system—and the same holds for legal money transaction chains such
as Western Union and MoneyGram—do not have a good reputation
as providers of cheap, fast and reliable worldwide transfers of rela-
tively small sums of money for the public at large.20 Besides the
relatively high costs charged for transfers, it is also problematic, for
example that countries to which people want to have money trans-
ferred do not always have a good and reliable formal banking system.
In that case, there is not enough certainty that the money will arrive
at its destination. This is regularly a reason for migrants to choose
underground banking. Groups of people can also be pointed out who
have no access to the formal banking system—particularly, for
example, persons who are staying illegally in a country, for whom
underground banking is actually the only option for conducting
financial transactions.21
16 Pathak, supra note 4, 2017; Perkel, supra note 14, 200; Razavy, supra note 4,
285; Van de Bunt, supra note 2, 115–118, 121–122.
17 De Goede (2003), supra note 2, 516–517.
18 Passas (2008), supra note 14, 42.
19 Passas (1999), supra note 1, 29; De Goede (2003), supra note 2, 521–522; Passas
(2003), supra note 4, 51–52; Pathak, supra note 4, 2015–2018; Perkel, supra note 14,
198–200; Sharma, supra note 2, 113.
20 De Goede (2007), supra note 5, 203.
21 Razavy, supra note 4, 287; Sharma, supra note 2, 101.
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The strong trust of customers in the reliability of underground
bankers—and not in regulation and supervision by the govern-
ment—as an advantage of underground banking can be considered as
an important starting point in developing and implementing the
regulation and combating policy. Assimilation of underground
banking into the formal banking system is central to this. It means
first of all that underground bankers should be offered the possibility
to participate in regulated financial transactions. In view of the fact
that underground banking is in principle limited to making money
transfers, an attempt could be made to simplify the rules and regu-
lations for this type of financial services as far as possible. A certain
minimum degree of regulation will have to apply nevertheless, in the
form of a registration or licensing system, prescribing identification
and reporting obligations and providing for government supervision.
For assimilation, it is also important for the formal banking system
to provide money transfer services having advantages similar to the
same services of underground bankers. The main concern in that case
is that global transfers are possible, with few costs attached, which
are conducted quickly and open to the public at large.
The assimilation described here thus comes down to the fact that
underground bankers will have to look more like ordinary bankers
and vice versa, subject to the precondition that compliance with the
relevant rules and regulations and government supervision are
guaranteed. The purpose of this is not to eliminate underground
banking as an institution based on trust, but only to modify it, while
offering the customers of underground bankers a real alternative on
the money transfer market.
The proposed assimilation is not based only on the idea that the
interests of the persons involved in underground banking may not be
ignored. It is based also on a more instrumental idea related to the
possibility of abuse of underground banking by criminals and ter-
rorists. By providing a legal form of underground banking which
lowers the threshold of the formal banking system, one attempts to
reduce the volume of money transferred by way of illegal under-
ground banking. Precisely a large volume of transactions with which
nothing is usually wrong prevents transactions connected with illicit
purposes from being easily noticed.22 The idea is that reducing the
volume will make it more difficult for criminals and terrorists to use
underground banking as a financial safe haven. In that case, the
flows of money still transferred outside the regulated channels can
22 Schramm & Taube, supra note 14, 418.
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relatively easily be considered as suspect. One then apparently has
something to hide and therefore chooses a form of financial services
in which the underground banker concerned does not comply with
the prescribed obligations, according to the reasoning. Viewed in this
light, the assimilation model could help to prevent the use or abuse of
underground banking by criminals and terrorists, although the model
does not provide a rock-hard guarantee that such use or abuse will
not occur any more. But the risk model cannot provide that guar-
antee either.
All in all, the assimilation model sounds rather promising, but this
does not mean that it is a panacea. The approach advocated results
precisely in formalisation of the core of underground banking,
namely an informal system that functions on the basis of trust. This
could lead to mistrust among the users of underground banking and
it cannot be ruled out that underground banking will continue to
evade government regulation.23 It is doubtful as well whether the
advantages of underground banking for customers can be achieved
just as easily within the formal financial system.24 The reservations
made with respect to the feasibility and efficacy of the use of the risk
model therefore apply to a certain extent to the assimilation model as
well. Nevertheless, because it takes account of the historical and
socio-economic backgrounds of informal banking, its embedment in
different cultures and the advantages of the services offered, the
assimilation model has more guarantees of success than the risk
model. For that reason, the literature frequently advocates the use in
one way or another of (elements of) the assimilation model described
here.25 It can be added that the assimilation model appeals to
underground bankers own—or if you like: social—responsibility to
provide their services in a transparent manner. Offering the possi-
bilities to provide their services legally—in accordance with all rules
23 Razavy, supra note 4, 291.
24 Smriti S. Nakhasi, Western Unionizing the Hawala? The Privatization of Haw-
alas and Lender Liability, 27 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Busi-
ness 475–496 (2007).
25 Passas (1999), supra note 1, 67–70; De Goede (2003), supra note 2, 528; Passas
(2003), supra note 4, 57–58; Pathak, supra note 4, 2059–2060; Perkel, supra note 14,
206–210; Rob McCusker, Underground Banking: Legitimate Remittance Network or
Money Laundering System?, Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice 4–5 (July
2005); Razavy, supra note 4, 288, 291; Sharma, supra note 2, 117–118; Shima Keene,
Hawala and Related Informal Value Transfer Systems. An Assessment in the Context
of Organised Crime and Terrorist Finance, The Defence Academy Journal 1, 18
(2007).
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and regulations applicable to financial service providers—would
actually enable underground bankers to assume that responsibility. If
this offer is ignored, this would justify taking measures aimed at
ending the activities of the underground bankers in questions.
III POLICY FOR REGULATING AND COMBATING
UNDERGROUND BANKING
3.4 FATF
A major international body in the field of combating money laun-
dering and terrorist financing is the FATF, an alliance of 32 countries
and two regional organisations. The FATF has developed 40 rec-
ommendations to combat money laundering and nine special rec-
ommendations to combat terrorist financing. The recommendations
are so authoritative that they can be referred to as the gold standard.
Compliance with these recommendations is actively monitored by a
system of mutual evaluation by the FATF members.26 One of the
special recommendations to combat terrorist financing reads as fol-
lows:
Each country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities, including
agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or value, including
transmission through an informal money or value transfer system or network, should
be licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF Recommendations that apply to
banks and non-bank financial institutions. Each country should ensure that persons
or legal entities that carry out this service illegally are subject to administrative, civil
or criminal sanctions.27
The core of this recommendation is clear: informal transfer systems do
not have to be prohibited in themselves, but should indeed be subject to
a regulation system that also sees to it that (also) underground bankers
comply with various obligations to combat money laundering and
terrorist financing. One of those obligations should encompass the
identification and registration of customers, fulfilment of various
administrative obligations and reporting of unusual transactions.28
26 William C. Gilmore, Dirty money. The evolution of international measures to
counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism 89–158 (Council of Europe
Publishing 2004).
27 Special Recommendation VI: Alternative Remittance.
28 Anand Ajay Shah, The international regulation of Informal Value Transfer
Systems, 3 Utrecht Law Review 204–215 (2007).
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With that, the FATF has not chosen the risk model, but it has not
yet fully embraced the assimilation model either. The approach
chosen is, after all, one-sided because nothing is said about any ef-
forts to be made by the formal banking system. Otherwise as well, the
text of the recommendation does not give the idea that account has
been taken of the backgrounds and advantages of underground
banking. In a subsequently published document of the
FATF—Combating the Abuse of Alternative Remittance Systems:
International Best Practices29—such points of view are indeed put
forward. A recommendation is made, for example that governments
should choose to take a flexible attitude, whereby effective measures
are taken to regulate underground banking but attention is also paid
to the risk that too stringent regulation could result in underground
banking being carried on even more covertly. For that reason, the
compliance burden should not be too heavy. In this document,
attention is also devoted to the importance of the provision of
information by the government to the providers of informal money
transfers on the obligations resting on them and how they can comply
with those obligations. If the recommendation discussed here is
viewed in the light of this document, it appears that the assimilation
model is already being much more strongly embraced, even though
the role of the formal banking system still remains undiscussed.
That the recommendations of the FATF in general and the rec-
ommendation on informal money transfers in particular are
authoritative is evident from the fact that many other international
organisations subsequently proposed similar measures. The Abu
Dhabi Declaration on Hawala of 16 May 2002 underscores that
underground banking should be the subject of government regulation
in accordance with the recommendations of the FATF. The decla-
ration emphasises that informal money transfer systems have many
positive aspects and that the transactions are usually related to legal
activities. It also warns about the risks of too restrictive regulation.
The recommendations in two reports by staff of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank follow the same line. Those
reports also advocate regulation of underground banking in a form
that takes account of the backgrounds of underground banking,
29 <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/32/15/34255005.pdf>.
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while pointing out as well the desirability of changes to the formal
banking system.30
3.5 European Union
In the European Union, the recommendations of the FATF are
reflected mainly in the (successive versions of) the Money Laundering
Directive.31 Pursuant to this Directive—stated briefly—the Member
States must provide rules relating to customer due diligence, obliga-
tions to report and administrative obligations. These rules should
apply, for example to financial institutions, by which the Directive
also means an undertaking which carries out the operations (…) of
currency exchange offices or money transmission or remittance offi-
ces.32 This places the operations of underground bankers within the
scope of the Money Laundering Directive, thus the Member States
must allow the aforementioned rules to apply to those operations.
Member States must monitor compliance with those rules and, where
necessary, take action against their violation.33
Another important Directive is the recently enacted Payment
Services Directive, which partly pertains to carrying out payment
transfers.34 This Directive provides an extensive standardisation of
payment services carried out in the European Union. The Member
30 Mohammed El Qorchi et al., Informal Funds Transfer Systems. An Analysis of
the Informal Hawala System 27 (IMF-World Bank Paper, 222) (IMF 2003); Cheng
Sung Lee et al., Approaches to a Regulatory Framework for Formal and Informal
Remittance Systems: Experiences and Lessons 23–29 (IMF 2005); R. Barry Johnston,
Work of the IMF in Informal Funds Transfer Systems, in Regulatory Frameworks
For Hawala and Other Remittance Systems 1–6 (IMF Monetary and Financial
Systems Department ed., 2005).
31 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the
financial system for the purpose of money laundering, OJ 1991, L 166/77; Directive
2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2001
amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial
system for the purpose of money laundering, OJ 2001, L 344/776; Directive 2005/60/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering
and terrorist financing, OJ 2005, L 309/15.
32 Article 3, paragraph 2a, Directive 2005/60/EC.
33 Articles 36–39 Directive 2005/60/EC.
34 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/
7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC,
OJ 2007, L 319/1.
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States must have implemented this Directive in their national legis-
lation by 1 November 2009 at the latest. Among other things, the
preamble refers to the special recommendation of the FATF on
informal transfer systems:
Given the desirability of registering the identity and whereabouts of all persons
providing remittance services and of according them all a measure of acceptance,
irrespective of whether they are able to meet the full range of conditions for au-
thorisation as payment institutions, so that none are forced into the black economy
and bring all persons providing remittance service within the ambit of certain min-
imum legal and regulatory requirements, it is appropriate and in line with the
rationale of Special Recommendation VI of the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering to provide a mechanism whereby payment service providers
unable to meet all those conditions may nevertheless be treated as payment insti-
tutions. For those purposes, Member States should enter such persons in the register
of payment institutions while not applying all or part of the conditions for author-
isation. However, it is essential to make the possibility of waiver subject to strict
requirements relating to the volume of payment transactions. Payment institutions
benefiting from a waiver should have neither the right of establishment nor the
freedom to provide services, nor should they indirectly exercise those rights when
being a member of a payment system.35
This passage expresses the idea that providers of money transfer
services can be exempted in some cases from the obligation to be
authorised, together with the corresponding obligations which are
central to the Payment Services Directive. In this way, an attempt is
made to prevent stringent regulations from actually causing the
providers of such services to evade government regulation. At the
same time, those providers of payment services are required to reg-
ister and the government is required to monitor their operations.
These providers are not allowed to offer their services in other
Member States.36 The Payment Services Directive provides as well for
a toughening of the Money Laundering Directive, whereby it is
explicitly stated that money transfer services are to be brought within
the scope of the latter Directive.37 With this set of measures, the
European Union intends to strike a balance between safeguarding
legitimate use of the [alternative remittance] systems and combating
their abuse for terrorist financing activities and, as can be added, for
laundering the proceeds of crime. The rules in the Payment Services
Directive are also expected to facilitate the gradual migration of
35 Preamble, paragraph 15, Directive 2007/64/EC.
36 Article 26, Directive 2007/64/EC.
37 Preamble, paragraph 58, and article 91, Directive 2007/64/EC.
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these [alternative remittance] services from the unofficial economy to
the official sector.38
IV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, it can be stated that the FATF primarily starts from the
assimilation model. It is striking, however, that the role of the formal
banking system remains undiscussed. Because the recommendations
of the FATF are very authoritative, the approach chosen by the
FATF can also be recognised in other international documents.
Within the European Union, the recommendations have been
developed into binding rules. These rules provide first and foremost
that providers of financial services, including underground bankers,
must comply with obligations relating to customer due diligence,
obligations to report and administrative obligations. This means that
underground bankers are expected to meet the requirements set by
the government on financial services. At the same time, the recent
Payment Services Directive shows that it has been borne in mind that
providers of money transfer services should not be confronted with
very stringent and comprehensive rules and regulations or, in other
words: that it should be relatively simple to enter the regulated
market of those services. Here, too, one recognises the assimilation
model, even though once again, no attention is paid to the role of the
formal banking system. This does not mean that the formal banking
system is not developing any initiative at all to provide cheap and fast
money transfers.39 The fact is that international recommendations
and regulations hardly give governments any impetus to devote
attention to and stimulate such initiatives.
When one reviews these findings, the impression is strengthened
that the assimilation advocated primarily entails that underground
bankers have to comply with the general rules developed for the
formal banking system. There is no objection to this in itself, but it
does give rise to the question of the extent to which such an approach
can actually start a movement whereby underground bankers and
their customers can conduct money transfers in accordance with the
applicable rules. All in all, the threshold for entering the regulated
market is still relatively high, even though this could change as a
38 Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing, 11
July 2008, Council Document 11778/08.
39 Keene, supra note 25, 15–16.
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result of implementation of the Payment Services Directive. Fur-
thermore, few initiatives have been developed as yet by governments
that express the advantages offered by underground banking in the
formal banking system as well. On closer analysis, the international
community still take relatively little account of the historic and socio-
economic backgrounds of informal banking systems, their embed-
ment in different cultures and the advantages of the services offered.
The regulation of underground banking can achieve gains in terms of
effectiveness and legitimacy only if (even) more attention is devoted
to these aspects.
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